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Adaptive Water Governance: Assessing the Institutional Prescriptions of
Adaptive (Co-)Management from a Governance Perspective and Defining
a Research Agenda
Dave Huitema 1, Erik Mostert 2, Wouter Egas 1, Sabine Moellenkamp 3, Claudia Pahl-Wostl 3, and
Resul Yalcin 4

ABSTRACT. This article assesses the institutional prescriptions of adaptive (co-)management based on a
literature review of the (water) governance literature. The adaptive (co-)management literature contains
four institutional prescriptions: collaboration in a polycentric governance system, public participation, an
experimental approach to resource management, and management at the bioregional scale. These
prescriptions largely resonate with the theoretical and empirical insights embedded in the (water)
governance literature. However, this literature also predicts various problems. In particular, attention is
called to the complexities associated with participation and collaboration, the difficulty of experimenting
in a real-world setting, and the politicized nature of discussion on governance at the bioregional scale. We
conclude this article by outlining a common research agenda that invites the collaborative efforts of adaptive
(co-)management and governance scholars.
Key Words: adaptive governance; bioregional perspective; experimentation; polycentric governance;
public participation; water management

INSTITUTIONAL PRESCRIPTIONS OF
ADAPTIVE (CO-)MANAGEMENT
The unpredictability of ecosystems and their
response to human interferences have been major
tenets in the literature on resource management in
the past decades. Dryzek (1987:28–33) suggested
that this unpredictability is due to, among other
things, the complexity, non-reducibility, spontaneity,
variability, and collective quality of ecosystems.
Social systems exhibit similar qualities, and
increasingly so as the web of connections between
countries, their economies, and governments grows
denser and denser because of globalization (Young
et al. 2006). This makes the management of “social–
ecological systems” (Berkes and Folke 1998) a
daunting challenge.
The literature on adaptive management (Gunderson
and Holling 2002) and that on co-management (e.
g., Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000) both speak to this
challenge and are currently seen as converging into
a literature on “adaptive co-management” (Olsson
1

et al. 2004, Armitage et al. 2007). Adaptive
management emphasizes learning and uses
structured experimentation in combination with
flexibility as ways to achieve this. Co-management
emphasizes the sharing of rights, responsibilities,
and power between different levels and sectors of
government and civil society. Adaptive comanagement, then, is a novel combination of the
learning dimension of adaptive management and the
linkage dimension of co-management (Olsson et al.
2004, Armitage et al. 2007).
We propose that what is now labeled as adaptive
co-management comes very close to the vision of
adaptive management as described by Kai Lee
(1993, 1999; cf. McLain and Lee 1996). His
conceptualization of adaptive management can be
labeled a non-technocratic variant of adaptive
management to contrast it with the technocratic
variant that Armitage et al. (2007) refer to. Whereas
the technocratic variant of adaptive management
focused on learning through experimentation and
learning only, the non-technocratic variant of
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adaptive management already contained both the
learning and the linkage dimensions now seen as
typical for adaptive co-management. Indeed, for
Lee (1993, 1999) adaptive management implied
several institutional prescriptions: collaboration,
experimentation, and a bioregional approach to
resource management. Collaboration refers, first, to
the fact that different government bodies have to
work together in order to manage issues that cross
jurisdictional boundaries and fall into different
policy sectors. Secondly, collaboration refers to the
need for collaboration between these bodies and
non-governmental stakeholders, such as individual
citizens and interest groups. Experimentation
implies the probing of the system to be managed,
monitoring its response, and adjusting interventions
on the basis of the findings. Unexpected outcomes
are not seen as failures but as an opportunity for
learning. As a final institutional prescription of
adaptive management, Lee (1993:57) suggests that
“seeing the ecosystems as a whole must precede
efforts to manage it.” According to him, this implies
a focus on the bioregion, also when such a region
crosses multiple administrative borders.
Having flagged the similarities between adaptive
co-management and this non-technocratic variant
of adaptive management, we will use the term
“adaptive (co-)management” in the remainder of
this article to reflect our intention to engage with
the literatures on adaptive co-management and nontechnocratic adaptive management. The starting
point for our paper was the observation that adaptive
(co-)management, despite its obvious attractiveness
as an idea, is very hard to introduce and sustain in
practice. Lee (1999:5) suggested that (his version
of) “adaptive management has been much more
influential as an idea than as a way of doing
conservation so far.” In a similar vein, Armitage et
al. (2007:6–10) point to the need to move beyond
“the limits” of adaptive co-management and suggest
“policy implications” as a key theme for research,
pointing to the need for more insight on enabling
policy environments. Other key matters that they
identify are “institutional design for adaptive comanagement,” “partnerships and power sharing,”
“learning, knowledge use, and social capital,” and
“conditions of adaptive co-management success
and failure.” Questions to be answered under these
headings relate to ways to establish cross-level
linkages, the conditions for partnerships that really
share power, and ways to move from instrumental
learning to learning about appropriate goals.

The research agenda outlined by Armitage et al.
(2007) suggests the need for greater understanding
of the working of the institutional prescriptions of
adaptive (co-)management. The broad and growing
stream of literature on “governance” is particularly
relevant for such questions because of its core focus
on institutions and their efficacy (Kjær 2004). In
this article, we take governance to mean “the whole
range of institutions and relationships involved in
the process of governing” (Pierre and Peters
2000:1). This includes both formal institutions, such
as laws, official policies, and organizational
structures, and informal institutions: the power
relations and practices that have developed and the
rules that are followed in practice.
In the next sections, we analyze what the governance
literature can tell us about the institutional
prescriptions from the adaptive (co-)management
literature. In keeping with the theme of this special
issue on water, we discuss the following three
questions:
●

Do the institutional prescriptions of adaptive
(co-)management resonate with the (water)
governance literature?

●

Are these requirements feasible and effective
—can they be adopted in practice, do they
deliver environmental improvements, and
why or why not?

●

What are the most salient questions for further
research concerning these institutional
requirements?

Our answers to the first two questions are based on
a literature review of the governance literature in
general and the water governance literature in
particular. The databases we searched included
different online library catalogs, Google Scholar,
and Web of Science, using keywords such as “water
management,” “water governance,” “polycentric
governance,” “public participation,” “learning,”
and “experiments,” and combinations of these
keywords. The third question will be answered on
the basis of our own inferences from this literature
review.
The boundaries between the governance literature
and the adaptive (co-)management literature are
somewhat vague. Several adaptive (co-)management
scholars have started to use concepts and
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approaches from the governance literature and now
contribute to the empirical body of knowledge on
governance (e.g., Scheffer et al. 2003, Folke et al.
2005, Olsson et al. 2006). In practice, we have
qualified literature as “governance literature” if the
author had also written extensively on governance
issues unrelated to natural resources management,
or explicitly used a social-science perspective and
social-science methods.
POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE
The first institutional prescription to be discussed is
polycentric governance. The adaptive (co-)
management literature suggests that a management
system should have multiple centers of power
(polycentric) rather than one center of control
(monocentric). In the governance literature,
polycentric governance systems are defined as
systems in which “political authority is dispersed to
separately constituted bodies with overlapping
jurisdictions that do not stand in hierarchical
relationship to each other” (Skelcher 2005:89).
Skelcher (2005) suggests that, even in the past, when
state-centric models of governance dominated,
governance never was completely “monocentric.”
What sets the current era apart, however, is a
relaxation of the traditional assumptions of
democratic constitutional engineering in government.
In the past, the ideal governance system consisted
of jurisdictions at a limited number of hierarchical
government levels (national, regional, and local)
without any overlaps in tasks. This is also known as
the “classical modernist” approach to institutional
design (Hajer 2003). Such a system is now seen as
unfeasible, ineffective, and inefficient. The “oldfashioned” mutual exclusivity between jurisdictions
operating at the same level and the rational
hierarchical ordering of jurisdictions at different
spatial levels has been abandoned (see, e.g., Hooghe
and Marks 2003). In its place is a system with a more
diffuse underlying order, a different division of
authority, and a more complicated set of hierarchical
relationships (McGinnis 2000) and “political
spaces” (Hajer 2003).
The oldest publications on polycentric governance
(e.g., Ostrom et al., 1961) are strongly concerned
with the self-governing capacity of (local)
communities. This had a normative background,
rooted in democratic thought about selfgovernment, but there is also a practical component
to it. The suggestion was that local communities all

face their own problems, and that their skills and
local knowledge place them in the best position to
address these problems. More recent scholarship in
this tradition (e.g., McGinnis 1999, Oakerson 1999,
Dietz et al. 2003, Karkkainen 2004, Ostrom 2005)
suggests that “institutional diversity” is a key
concept here. Institutional diversity is normatively
valuable in itself, but also offers considerable
advantages when complex and uncertain problems
need to be addressed. Polycentric governance
systems are supposed to be more resilient and better
able to cope with change and uncertainty. The
reasons for this are, first, that issues with different
geographical scopes can be managed at different
scales. Secondly, polycentric systems have a high
degree of overlap and redundancy, and this makes
them less vulnerable: if one unit fails, others may
take over their functions (see, e.g., Granovetter
1981, Perrow 1999). Finally, the large number of
units makes it possible to experiment with new
approaches so that the units can have the opportunity
to learn from each other (Ostrom 2005:181–182).
Polycentric governance systems may also exhibit
certain disadvantages. For instance, economies of
scale may be lost, especially if the basic units in the
system are very small. Moreover, collective
decision making is difficult because of the need to
accommodate the “complexity of spatial patterning,
multiple functional overlays, partial polity
formation, and variable system coupling” (Skelcher
2005:97, 102). The answer is improved
coordination, but the “transaction costs”—the costs
of consultations, reaching agreement, and enforcing
such agreements—are high (Imperial and
Hennessey 1999, Kemper et al. 2005:11). If
coordination fails, unnecessary duplication of
efforts and counterproductive actions may result.
Another potential disadvantage is the loss of
democratic accountability in a system where
responsibilities are very dispersed (e.g., Sørensen
and Torfing 2004, Young 2002). This need not apply
to the basic (decentral) units of government and
certain civil-society organizations, which can
exhibit greater levels of accountability and
transparency than far-removed, central-government
bodies. It may apply, however, to the outcomes of
collaborative processes and to new bodies such as
intergovernmental committees or specialized
agencies that are set up to address specific issues.
Skelcher (2005) suggests that such bodies tend to
prioritize goal achievement over democratic
procedure and are often set up to circumvent
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“troublesome” and “time-consuming” procedures.
Heilman and Johnson (1992) make a similar point,
specifically about the privatization of responsibilities
for American water-quality policy that took place
in the 1980s and 1990s.
In empirical terms, we can observe that all watermanagement systems are polycentric, but in
different degrees and in different ways. Tasks and
competencies may be shared within the
governmental sector, but also between the
governmental sector and the non-governmental
sector (see, e.g., Meinzen-Dick 1997, Correia 1998,
Sproule-Jones 2002, Burchi and Spreij 2003,
Moellenkamp 2004, Blomquist et al. 2005).
Research attempting to link “polycentricity” to the
performance of institutions is rare and plagued with
difficulties. One complication is that a generally
accepted scale to measure “polycentricity” does not
yet exist. Another is that environmental
improvements are often not measured, and, when
they are, cannot easily be attributed to variations in
the institutional setting. For instance, Sproule-Jones
(2002) attempted to analyze the links between, on
the one hand, the institutional set-up of 43 “Areas
of Concern” in the Great Lakes of North America,
in terms of approaches to planning, stakeholder
involvement, etc., and, on the other, their
effectiveness in terms of environmental improvement,
but he could not attribute environmental
improvements to the differences in institutional setup. An effort to analyze the effectiveness of
integrated catchment management (ICM) programs
with different institutional set-ups in the Australian
states also ran into problems as monitoring systems
were essentially geared toward activities (outputs),
rather than outcomes in terms of sustainability
(Bellamy et al. 2002).
Hence, there is little hard evidence that polycentric
systems are more flexible and less vulnerable than
monocentric systems, that they reflect local
conditions and preferences better, or that more
experimentation and learning take place. However,
many case studies of individual polycentric watermanagement systems exist. Much research has been
done on the management of “common-pool
resources,” such as irrigation systems and local
fisheries, by the users themselves (Ostrom 1990,
2001, Agrawal 2001). This literature suggests that,
for the management of larger common-pool
resources “nested” institutions are necessary
(Ostrom 1990, Karkkainen 2004). These exist, for
instance, in some large-scale irrigation systems,

where local user groups are often responsible for
the management of the smallest “tertiary” irrigation
and drainage canals, and an association of user
groups or government is responsible for the largerscale infrastructure (cf. Meinzen-Dick 1997).
According to Meinzen-Dick (2007), the general rule
is that private or collective-action institutions have
advantages at smaller spatial scales, but state
institutions are better suited for larger spatial scales
because of their greater ability to coordinate across
greater areas and larger numbers of users.
The coordination problem in polycentric settings
has been studied by Imperial (1999, 2005). On the
basis of a case study in Rhode Island, he argues that
fragmentation or duplication of authority is not
always a bad thing, can be as effective as centralized
coordination mechanisms, and may add value
through collaboration. His analysis suggests that
transaction costs decrease over time as the parties
get to know each other better and manage to
cooperate in relatively modest projects to start with.
This would imply that, when sufficient
collaborative efforts are made and trust has
developed, polycentric governance could be both
efficient and effective (Imperial 2005). Karkkainen
(2004) makes similar points for the Chesapeake Bay
Program and the U.S.–Canada Great Lakes
Program. Yet, when the parties do not manage to
increase trust among themselves or continue to
defend their bureaucratic turf, fragmentation can
result, and conflicts and competency struggles
between the different units may erupt (see SprouleJones 2002:850, Bellamy et al. 2002, Kemper et al.
2005).
According to the governance literature, the success
of collaborative processes is not only influenced by
trust, but also by the way in which parties order their
activities. Sproule-Jones (2002:848–849) suggests
that “pooled coupling” creates better results than
“sequential coupling” and “reciprocal coupling.”
Pooled coupling implies that collaborating bodies
become responsible for independent parts of an
intervention program. Sequential coupling implies
that actions are undertaken after another, and
reciprocal coupling implies that the bodies involved
take turns in completing certain specific actions.
The latter two approaches are more risky than
pooled coupling because the weakest link may cause
a delay for the entire project.
Finally, we need to acknowledge that the “classicalmodernist” approach to institutional design (Hajer
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2003), with its emphasis on mutual exclusivity of
jurisdictions, is still popular in governance practice.
This may partly be explained by the potential
disadvantages of polycentric governance just
discussed, and partly by the major concern with
efficiency and cost cutting and, therefore, with
reducing and preventing overlaps and redundancy
(cf. Pierre and Peters 2000). In addition, people in
the “classical” institutions may be afraid of losing
power and, therefore, oppose more polycentrism.
However, we have not found literature on this last
point.
We can conclude that polycentric governance is
considered desirable in the governance literature.
There is little hard empirical evidence that proves
the superiority of polycentric governance systems
in terms of performance under uncertainty and
complexity, but there are many case studies that
provide support for the notion of polycentric
governance. Still, we have to keep an eye open for
potential coordination problems, transaction costs,
and problems of democratic legitimacy, and we
need to be aware that polycentric thinking—
especially its focus on redundancy—goes against
the “classical-modernist” line of thinking on
institutions.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The second institutional prescription of the adaptive
(co-)management literature we discuss here is
public participation. Public participation means
different things to different people and may take
several forms, ranging from information supply—
to consultation, discussions with the public, codecision making—to a situation in which the
“public” is in charge of parts of natural resources
management, for example, through water users’
associations. Moreover, “public” may refer to the
unorganized “general public,” to different
categories of water users, and to their organizations
(Mostert 2003, Reed 2008).
In our use of the term “public participation” here
refers to collaboration between governmental and
non-governmental stakeholders. Collaboration
between governmental and non-governmental
stakeholders is an important theme in the
governance literature on common-pool resource
management, network management, and process
management (Glasbergen 1990, Ostrom 1990,
Keohane and Ostrom 1995, Klijn and Koppenjan

2000, De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2003).
Moreover, over the years, a specialized literature on
public participation has developed (e.g., Arnstein
1969, Pateman 1970, Renn and Webler 1995,
Coenen et al. 1998, Mostert 2003, Ridder et al. 2005,
Mostert et al. 2007, Huitema et al. 2007, Reed 2008).
Much of this literature promulgates public
participation from a normative viewpoint, but it
makes empirical claims as well. Public participation
would improve the quality of decision making by
opening up the decision-making process and
making better use of the information and creativity
that is available in society. Moreover, it would
improve public understanding of the management
issues at stake, make decision making more
transparent, and might stimulate the different
government bodies involved to coordinate their
actions more in order to provide serious follow-up
to the inputs received. Management itself would
become less controversial, less litigation would take
place, and implementation of decisions would be
much smoother. Finally, public participation could
improve democracy. Public participation would be
imperative whenever government does not have
enough resources (information, finance, power,
etc.) to manage an issue effectively, as is usually the
case in water management.
Experiences with public participation have been
reported in several research projects (e.g., Cuff
2001, Ison et al. 2004, Huitema et al. 2007). In the
HarmoniCOP project (Harmonizing COllaboarive
Planing, http://www.harmonicop.uos.de/), Mostert
et al. (2007) conducted a systematic description and
analysis of participatory processes in 10 European
river basins. In several basins, relations between
different stakeholders improved. In some cases, e.
g., the Dordogne basin, a new basin-wide public
organization was established as a result of the
participatory process. In most cases, stakeholders
obtained a better understanding of the management
issues at stake and got to know and appreciate each
others’ perspectives, which opened up possibilities
for win–win solutions, and in a few basins, tangible
improvements for the stakeholders and for the
environment could be identified. In the Dee Basin
(Scotland), for instance, an initial proposal for a
wastewater treatment plant had been put forward by
local authorities to ensure compliance with the
Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (91/271/
EEC). Due to the contentious nature of the proposal,
the local community was invited to become
involved in the process. This resulted in the
development of solutions that the authorities had
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not previously considered, such as the inclusion of
wetlands. As a result, the initial proposal was
changed, enabling an increase in amenity values,
water quality, and biodiversity within the area and
greater ownership of the solutions developed.
Moving to the U.S., Birkhoff (2003) analyzed public
participation in water reuse projects in Georgia,
Texas, and California. She found that substantively
better decisions emerged when diverse interests,
knowledge, and expertise were involved in the
decision-making process. Conversely, when
stakeholders were not fully involved in framing,
analyzing, generating, and implementing solutions
to complex public problems, they sought other ways
of articulating and meeting their interests,
hampering the decision process (Birkhoff 2003:
C-5). This resonates with the findings of SprouleJones (2002) for the Great Lakes.
As to the U.S. generally, Sabatier et al. (2005:4–7)
proclaim the end of the “top-down, agencydominated approach with some provisions for
comments,” and its replacement with “a much more
collaborative bottom-up approach involving
negotiations and problem solving.” On the basis of
empirical research on several U.S. collaborative
water-management projects, they conclude that
collaborative approaches may be better adapted to
diffuse and complex problems and may fit better
with certain local realities than top-down
governance. Their analysis of the “idiosyncratic
contexts” in which collaborative processes occur
reveals that low levels of trust in normal decisionmaking processes may actually be conducive to
collaborative processes, because participants are
then more motivated to join, if only because they
do not want to be bypassed by the others (see Focht
and Trachtenberg 2005). Others (e.g., Glasbergen
1990, Leach and Pelkey 2001) suggest that a lack
of alternative venues for the participatory process,
such as litigation, is a very important determinant
of the willingness to join participatory processes.
This is somewhat ironic, however, because the
threat of the use of alternative venues is an important
incentive for water managers to consider
participatory processes in the first place, as such
venues increase the power of the potential
participants to block or delay projects.
The literature mentions several difficulties with
public-participation processes. The most important
difficulty encountered in the HarmoniCOP project
was the lack of clarity about the role of stakeholder

involvement (Mostert et al. 2007). In five out of 10
cases, the status of the initiative in which the
stakeholders could become involved was not very
clear. Often, the organizers had no decision-making
powers, and more often than not, the stakeholders
doubted that their input would make a difference.
This can be destroy any motivation to participate.
Lack of clarity about the role of stakeholder
participation in the HarmoniCOP cases was only
partly a matter of limited communication and
miscommunication. At least as important were
political and institutional factors. Quite often, the
existing governance style was not participatory, and
it took a lot of convincing to move toward a more
collaborative approach. In many cases, the
authorities lacked experience with multi-party
approaches, relied heavily on technical expertise,
were not willing to change, feared losing power, or
feared that too broad participation could threaten
the confidentiality of proceedings. Consequently,
participation often remained limited to providing
information or consultation. Similar problems are
reported by Leach and Pelkey (2001), Olsson et al.
(2004), Sabatier et al. (2005), Videira et al. (2006),
Warner (2006), and Huitema et al. (2007).
Implementing public participation may require
institutional and cultural change. Sometimes,
opportunities for truly participatory approaches
may arise at the local level or in specific policy
processes—an influential politician may, for
instance, favor public participation, or there is a
public controversy that cannot be resolved without
involving the public. Provided that these processes
are well organized, they increase positive
experiences with and support for public
participation and may prepare the ground for
institutional and cultural change (cf. Pahl-Wostl et
al. 2008).
Other difficulties encountered in the HarmoniCOP
project included limited resources and time of
organizers for organizing participatory processes
and of other stakeholders for participating in these
processes. Writing on this issue in Australia,
Bellamy et al. (2002) suggest that representational
requirements in the various ICM processes there
were excessive for some community representatives,
causing burnout and subsequently unrepresentative
participation. Typically, stakeholder groups and
individuals with much more resources (information,
money, time, skills, etc.) are overrepresented and
can exert more influence. When partnership and
power sharing are goals, organizers of participatory
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processes should take care to actively support
underprivileged stakeholders, as public participation
may otherwise reinforce existing power imbalances
rather than reduce them. Sabatier et al. (2005) and
Huitema et al. (2007) make similar points for the U.
S. and the Netherlands, respectively.
Finally, public participation can only be a success
if the process is relevant for the stakeholders that
are supposed to participate. This requires that the
agenda for the process is not unilaterally
determined, but reflects the concerns of all
stakeholders. This insight may conflict with the
practice of technocratic adaptive management. As
the cases discussed by McLain and Lee (1996)
show, technocratic adaptive management can result
in a narrow definition of the problem by the experts
and/or the authorities (see also the following section
on experimentation). This problem is less likely in
the adaptive (co-)management approaches discussed
here, as they emphasize collaboration between
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders.
But, whatever approach is followed, it is important
to review the often-implicit assumptions and policy
choices that are made (e.g., a choice for a long time
horizon or for nature protection) and to allow the
stakeholders that are supposed to participate to
question these assumptions and choices. This can
prevent stakeholders from staying out of the process
and opting for more confrontational strategies.
Moreover, it is more transparent and democratic.
EXPERIMENTATION
The third institutional prescription, experimentation,
can be interpreted in two different ways: as a
research methodology and as an approach to
management. In the first approach, experimentation
is a means to test hypotheses on ecosystem response
to different management interventions in order to
provide a scientific basis for management (e.g., Lee
1999; Richter et al. 2003). This approach fits very
well in a positivist philosophy, in which the experts
provide objective and relatively certain information
to the authorities, who then make decisions on the
basis of this information. Given the emphasis on
expert knowledge in such experiments, there
usually is little room or perceived need for public
participation in the experiments.
In the second approach, management itself is seen
as a form of experimentation. This approach
acknowledges that management is always based on

incomplete and uncertain information and
consequently has a hypothetical character, and all
management can, therefore, be seen as a kind of
hypothesis testing (e.g., Walters 1997, Pahl-Wostl
2006). Management as experimentation fits better
in a constructivist approach to science, which sees
science as socially determined and reflecting both
social realities and physical realities. In this
approach, the experiment is likely to function as a
“boundary object” bringing in multiple stakeholders.
They can start to learn from and with each other
across different perspectives, especially if network
relations change through repeated interactions and
the emergence of trust (Lejano and Ingram 2009).
This in turn may increase their capacity to deal with
uncertainty and change (e.g., Moberg and Galaz
2005).
Experimentation as a research methodology has
received much attention in the governance literature
(e.g., Fischer 1995, Martin and Sanderson 1999,
Brodkin and Kaufman 2000, Greenberg et al. 2003).
Most experiments described in the governance
literature are not so much interventions in
ecosystems (such as the introduction of species or
the construction of dams) as policy experiments
involving the application of different policy
interventions (e.g., taxes, regulations) at various
comparable locations so as to assess the determining
features of their effectiveness. The governance
literature views experimentation as one of the most
rigorous methodologies for policy evaluation
(Fischer 1995, Greenberg et al. 2003). Yet,
governance scholars have also been critical. They
have raised questions about what can actually be
learned from experiments. Fischer (1995) has
suggested that experiments can be used for testing
whether given goals can be achieved through a
measure under consideration, but not for discussing
the appropriateness of these goals. Governance
scholars also observe that experiments often raise
ethical concerns because segments of the public are
treated differently, and principles of justice and
equity can be violated. Finally, experiments are
often discussed as an element of the “rational
paradigm,” which assumes one decision maker with
clear goals, a limited set of well-known policy
alternatives, and time to await the outcomes of
research (i.e., an experiment; Greenberg et al.
2003:46). In practice, these conditions are hardly
ever met. All these concerns are part of the reason
why “quasi experiments”—experiments without
differential treatment of target and control group, or
without a control group—are more common than
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full-blown experiments. Obviously, the possibilities
for quasi experiments are, in principle, better in
polycentric governance systems than in monocentric
systems, as the diversity of approaches will de facto
create multiple “policy laboratories” (for this term,
see, e.g., Rabe 2004).
Experimentation as an approach to management has
also received considerable attention. The literature
on planning is of relevance here (e.g., Lindblom
1959, van Gunsteren 1976, Boyne et al. 2004). This
literature describes the optimism about the “rational
planning model” that pervaded the first decades
after World War II. In essence, the rational planning
model posits that decisions must be based on a
scientific analysis of the issue at stake in all its
aspects, all possible alternative approaches for
addressing the issue, and all different effects of all
these alternatives. Constituting elements of this
model are centralized decision making, utilitarian
decision logic (as expressed in cost–benefit
analysis), long-term planning, and a willingness to
intervene in social–ecological systems on a grand
scale. Governance scholars have come to criticize
the rational planning model for a variety of reasons.
According to the critics, this model denies the
political aspects of decision making. It is described
as undemocratic and ineffective because it delegates
all power to experts and prevents “the intelligent
and responsible adaptations of independent citizens,
which are indispensable in time of rapid and
multiple change” (van Gunsteren 1976:152).
Moreover, it would simply be impossible to obtain
all information for making this model work.
The debate on rational planning was obviously won
by those resisting plan-led social development, and
with this, a strong aversion to large-scale
experimentation has been instilled in the
governance literature. Governance scholars have
tended to favor small steps and relatively passive
forms of experimentation, which they refer to as
“piecemeal engineering” (Popper 1985 [1944]:309)
or “trial and error learning” (Collingridge 1992).
Collingridge emphasizes that changes should be
kept small in order to limit the costs of errors and
allow the identification of the causes of errors, that
the trials should be designed and conducted in a
participatory fashion, involving many specialist
groups serving their own narrowly defined interest
and possessing specific expertise, and that actions
should be coordinated by mutual interaction rather
than planned from the center.

Experimentation, whether as a research methodology
or an approach to management, is not a neutral
activity (Guba and Lincoln 1989, Funtowicz and
Ravetz 1990, Abma and In ‘t Veld 2001, Sanderson
2002, Backstrand 2003). The choice of measures to
study and the interpretation and presentation of the
results always depend on the values and influence
of the persons and institutions involved (cf., e.g.,
Guba and Lincoln 1989, Pielke 2007). Different
ways for dealing with this issue have been
suggested, including participatory and collaborative
approaches and “extended peer review” (Funtowicz
and Ravetz 1990, Backstrand 2003). Extended peer
review implies that the framing of the research
problem, the method of investigation, and the results
are subjected to comments from non-scientists.
Others go further and reconceptualize experimentation
as an interactive process in which all participants
should have an equal say on a range of matters,
including problem definition, and researchers act as
process facilitators or brokers rather than distant
observers (Abma and In ‘t Veld, 2001; and along
similar lines, Pielke 2007, Huitema and Turnhout
2009). Both suggestions fit with an adaptive (co-)
management approach. Moreover, they could make
science more responsive and transparent and better
guarantee the relevance of the experiments.
When looking for empirical research on
experimentation, we found very little literature
containing analysis of experiments in the field of
water governance. This is not to say that no scientific
experiments are undertaken or that policy makers
and other stakeholders do not draw lessons from the
results of management in practice. There have been
many attempts to learn from institutional variation
and interpret differences as quasi experiments, but
such analyses are plagued by attribution problems.
Ross and Dovers (2007), to mention one example,
attempt to tease out policy lessons from the diversity
of institutional approaches in Australian water
management. They encounter serious problems as
the monitoring of outcomes is often weak and
attribution to policies extremely difficult (see also
Blomquist et al. 2005).
We found more systematic analyses of the dynamics
surrounding experiments in the area of social policy,
and the findings there confirm some of the
complications involved in using experiments as a
learning methodology. Greenberg et al. (2003)
analyzed 143 experiments in that field and found
that experiments are normally officially motivated
by a desire to generate directly applicable lessons
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for policy, or to add to the stock of policy-relevant
information. Brodkin and Kaufman (2000) observe
how each experiment contained a theory on the
problem at hand. These theories tend to reflect the
political views at the time the experiments start. As
these can change quickly, the experiments may
become “time capsules” (see also Greenberg et al.
2003), and once the results are out, very different
issues may have gained prominence. Brodkin and
Kaufman (2000) find that interpreting experiments
is a political process, with various opponents
fighting for alternative interpretations and using the
experiment as an instrument for advocacy. Selective
interpretation and distortion are normal phenomena
in this fight. According to Brodkin and Kaufman
(2000), experimentation “may be more apt to
reiterate than to challenge conventional wisdom”
(cf. Fischer 1995). Sanderson (2002:13–17) studied
the recent British experience with experiments
under the Labour governments and came to the
conclusion that they do play a role in policy change,
but not because outcomes are systematically
monitored and then fed back into policy. He
distinguished between experiments and “pilots.”
Pilots are demonstration projects for a new way of
addressing problems, with no intention of producing
evidence upon which to base government policy,
but rather with the aim of selling the policies to
others. These results can, however, be contrasted
with Carol Weiss’s (1977:531) oft-cited analysis of
three quantitative studies. She found that the most
common use of research is not “the application of
specific data to specific problems,” but
“enlightenment.” Even research that challenges
current values and political feasibilities is often
judged useful by decision makers, and in the long
run, may have profound effects on policy at a later
stage (see also Amara et al. 2004).
THE BIOREGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Adaptive (co-)management implies a focus on the
bioregion, also when such a bioregion crosses
administrative boundaries. For water management,
the bioregional perspective translates into
management at the basin level, which may be called
the “river-basin approach,” the ”water-systems
approach,” “integrated water resources management,”
or ICM; see, e.g., Teclaff 1967, Lundqvist et al.
1985, Mitchell 1990, Mostert 2000). As Schlager
and Blomquist (2000:1) observe: “For the last 25
years, prescriptions of the water policy literature
have centered upon two themes. The first is that ‘the

watershed’ is the appropriate scale for organizing
water resource management [...]. The second is that
since watersheds are regions to which political
jurisdictions almost never correspond, and
watershed-scale decision making structures do not
usually exist, they should be created.” The latter can
be achieved by combining existing jurisdictions,
effectively creating a collaboration, or by
transferring existing responsibilities to the basin
level and creating a “unitary” river basin
organization (Schlager and Blomquist 2000:3).
Suggesting a preference for the latter, analysts have
called the first approach “weak” and the second
“strong” arrangements (Schlager and Blomquist
2000:4). Indeed, many proponents of the river-basin
approach have tended to favor the “strong” type of
organization. For instance, the World Resources
Institute (2006) states: “the levels of authority that
governments grant to RBOs [river basin
organizations, authors] are obviously critical to their
abilities to manage their respective basins. The most
successful RBOs have strong bases of support
among basin governments, and high levels of
authority through formal instruments like
legislation.” Other scholars, however, have
questioned both the feasibility and desirability of
unitary river-basin authorities (Biswas 2004) and
have proposed cooperation across boundaries as the
key to success (cf. Mitchell 1990, Margerum and
Born 1995, Falkenmark et al. 2004, Mostert et al.
2009).
Among governance scholars, the creation of
governance institutions at the appropriate scale is
discussed as a matter of “optimization” (Ahn et al.
1998) or “fit” (Young 2002). Both concepts refer to
the congruence or compatibility between
ecosystems and institutional arrangements (Young
2002:20–22). The arguments speaking in favor of
the creation of a river-basin-scale approach are
mainly related to the perceived failures of current
institutions. These include lack of recognition of
interdependencies at the river-basin scale; lack of
cooperation between institutions; lack of
transparency, making the institutional structure
difficult to understand for “outsiders” and thereby
limiting (public) participation; overlooking of
problems that do not fit in established programs;
and finally, the existence of a lax management
setting in which special interests such as farmers
and industry can dominate (Schlager and Blomquist
2000:2–3). River-basin-scale institutions are
supposed to address these.
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Governance scholars raise several issues in relation
to the institution and operation of river-basin
organizations (Imperial and Hennessey 1999:5).
First, they suggest that the boundaries of river basins
are not necessarily so clear or “natural” (Schlager
and Blomquist 2000:12–17). The idea of “the” river
basin suggests a certain simplicity, which in reality
does not exist as river basins are connected
(sometimes by human intervention) and nested.
This means that defining the boundaries of a basin
requires choice, and this implies a role for politics.
To quote Schlager and Blomquist (2000:15–16):
“Boundaries are multiple, overlapping, and often
contested because people experience and attempt to
deal with a host of problems and opportunities that
vary in scale from the local to the regional. Drawing
boundaries is the first step in determining who
decides and how and with what effects. Different
boundaries imply different decision makers and
different effects.” Some communities may lose
local control, whereas others more may gain more
control. Especially those who benefit from the
current boundaries may object to reshaping the
boundaries.
Secondly, governance scholars draw attention to the
fact that after founding a river-basin organization,
it becomes necessary to formulate decision-making
arrangements. Two available alternatives mentioned
in this respect are consensus and elite decision
making. Consensus decision making draws the risk
of gridlock, whereas elite decision making may
result, among other things, in the exploitation or
oppression of minorities (Schlager and Blomquist
2000:17–18) or in non-implementation of decisions
if influential stakehoklders have not been involved
(cf. Ridder et al. 2005). In practice, decision-making
arrangements are a mixture of these options.
Imperial and Hennessey (1999:27–35) suggest that,
in designing decision-making arrangements, the
emphasis should be on regular meetings between
the partners, reduction of power and information
asymmetries, minimizing the risk of strategic
behavior from participants, and enabling (bureaucratic,
legal, professional, and political) accountability.
Thirdly there are issues of authority, that is, issues
of tasks and responsibilities for the new
organization (Schlager and Blomquist 2000:20–
23). Governance scholars warn that large unitary
river-basin authorities are just as susceptible to
“bureaucratic pathologies” as any other bureaucracy
(cf. Biswas 2004). Schlager and Blomquist (2000)
make the point that institution building tends not to

follow a pre-established design but can be better
described as a patchwork. In composing the
patchwork, environmental concerns are far from
dominant. Instead, economies of scale, the division
of skills across organizations, the costs of
coordination, and issues of culture and political
identity are said to be more important (Schlager and
Blomquist 2000:20–23). Interestingly enough,
governance scholars suggest that a patchwork of
institutions at various overlapping levels may not
only be more feasible, but also more desirable from
an environmental perspective than a unitary riverbasin authority because of the possibility for
reorganizing the patchwork according to the
necessary task (for more explanation, see, e.g., the
section on polycentric governance and Ostrom and
Janssen (2004)).
The idea of addressing water issues at the basin scale
has been influential in practice. In a worldwide
survey, Dinar et al. (2005) found hundreds of
transboundary basin organizations. Supporting the
idea of institution building as a patchwork,
governance scholars find that the pattern of
institution building reflects the importance of
governance considerations (politics, institutions)
vis-à-vis environmental goals. For instance,
Schlager and Blomquist (2000:4; quoting others)
suggest that most American examples of river-basin
organizations reflect their current institutional
contexts, in the sense that they usually do not have
formal decision-making powers and sanctioning
authority. Conca et al. (2006) analyzed a worldwide
set of 62 transboundary river agreements. They
found (Conca et al. 2006:271–282), among other
things, that many agreements do not include all
states in a basin and that transboundary agreements
are concentrated in basins with a tradition of
cooperation. They also found that hegemonic states
are more likely to participate in such agreements,
and that agreements tend to express both the need
for responsible management and state rights.
Finally, their data tentatively suggest that the
content of such agreements depends on power
relations between the signatories, with the
agreements stressing principles that are advantageous
to hegemonic states.
Imperial and Hennessey (1999:22) suggest that the
“collaborative capacity” of organizations operating
in a basin depends on their capacity for problem
solving, slack resources, and stable sources of
funding. Furthermore, concurrent with Ostrom and
Janssen (2004), their analysis of six U.S. cases
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suggests that a high collaborative capacity may be
correlated to the presence of an “institutionally rich
environment” (Imperial and Hennessey 1999:22),
meaning that multiple organizations have
overlapping roles to play in water management. This
further supports the case for polycentric governance
systems.
There is little empirical evidence for the
effectiveness of the river-basin approach, either in
its monocentric form (unitary river-basin
authorities) or its polycentric form (collaboration at
the basin scale), in the literature discussed here.
Dinar et al. (2005:4–5, 15) suggest that basin-level
governance institutions are a necessary but
insufficient condition for successful resource
management, meaning that the absence of such
institutions will lead to the failure of management
but their presence does not necessarily lead to
success. They suggest the responsiveness to subbasin stakeholders is one of the more important
factors in explaining institutional effectiveness.
Imperial and Hennessey (1999:23) provide
evidence of environmental improvements as a
consequence of collaborations at the basin level,
which resulted from a shared set of regulations.
Additional benefits that they find are the emergence
of economies of scale in dividing tasks across
government bodies, greater citizen involvement,
and learning in the form of increased levels of trust
between organizations and greater success in
lobbying higher-level authorities. Some authors
contest the added value of the approach, however,
and suggest that the focus on the geographic
boundaries in explaining governance performance
has obscured other important variables, such as
population growth, international relations, and
regional economic cooperation (e.g., Pimentel at al.
1994, Allan 2003, Wirkus and Böge 2005, Mostert
2009).
In all this, we have to remember that the design of
management systems is not purely a matter of
expediency and practical exigencies, but also a
matter of politics and influence (cf. Klijn and
Koppenjan 2006). We cannot design institutions
from scratch because of opposition by those who
have vested interests in the present institutions.
Moreover, it might be too intellectually challenging
as it is very hard to predict with any degree of
certainty how completely new institutions will work
out in practice. Institutional design calls for careful
experimentation and learning from experience (see
the preceding section on experimentation).

ADAPTIVE (CO-)MANAGEMENT AND
GOVERNANCE: SUMMARY AND
RESEARCH AGENDA
We have discussed the institutional prescriptions
mentioned in the adaptive (co-)management
literature. We concluded that four prescriptions are
considered key: polycentric governance, public
participation, experimentation, and a bioregional
approach. Polycentric governance refers to
governance systems in which “political authority is
dispersed to separately constituted bodies with
overlapping jurisdictions that do not stand in
hierarchical relationship to each other” (Skelcher
2005:89). Public participation can be defined as
collaboration between governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders. “Experimentation”
could be interpreted as a research methodology, or
as an approach to management that recognizes our
limited knowledge and emphasizes learning from
experience. The bioregional approach or river-basin
approach could be interpreted as a call for a unitary
river-basin authority, or as a call for collaboration
at the river-basin level.
We have asked ourselves whether these institutional
prescriptions resonate with the literature on
governance, whether the prescriptions are
politically feasible, and whether they would be
effective in practice. We can conclude that
governance scholarship provides theoretical
backing for polycentricity, as polycentric systems
are expected to promote greater capacity to learn
and cope with change. However, the governance
literature warns of potential coordination problems
and high transaction costs, and suggests that
democratic legitimacy may be a serious issue in
polycentric governance systems. Polycentricity is a
fact of life, but the effects of variations in
polycentricity are hard to measure in reality. At the
level of case studies on common-pool resources,
there is evidence that polycentricity is an asset,
certainly for institutions that are nested.
Public participation is strongly backed by
theoretical arguments in the governance literature.
Governance scholars suggest that public participation
can improve the quality of decisions and can
improve the legitimacy of management and improve
its reflexivity. Whether or not public participation
is feasible depends on the ability and willingness of
stakeholders to participate and of policy makers to
organize participation. Stakeholders and ordinary
citizens are not always able and willing to
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participate. Important factors in the decision
whether or not to participate are the resources and
the level of organization of interest groups, the
existence of alternative venues for interest
representation, and the status of the participatory
processes vis-à-vis the formal government decision
process. Policy makers, in turn, are not always
willing or able to invite public participation or to
use its outcomes fully, especially if the management
culture is technocratic. However, there is ample
empirical evidence that public participation can
contribute to decision making and can result in more
creative and new solutions, can improve relations
between those involved, and can prevent legal
challenges during later stages of the decision
process.
The governance literature discusses two forms of
experimentation. Experimentation as a research
methodology is theoretically sound, but governance
scholars consider it more appropriate for
instrumental, technical issues than for goal
reflection. Experimentation as an approach to
management is also theoretically sound, but
governance scholars strongly prefer small-scale
experiments to large-scale experiments because of
the costs and risk involved in large-scale
experiments. For both forms of experiments,
governance scholars would prefer participatory
variants, so that the matters raised, the actual course
of the experiment and the interpretation of the
results can be subjected to societal review and tested
for relevance. Our literature review found relatively
little evidence on the effectiveness of experiments,
but a discussion of experiments in social policy
suggests that they are often used as “pilots” in order
to sell new policies or have an “enlightenment
function”; far less often are they used to develop
new policy in the short term.
In the field of water management, the bioregional
approach translates into the river-basin approach.
This is a longstanding idea in the water governance
literature, and governance scholars see the riverbasin approach as an opportunity to improve the fit
between the scale of the ecosystems and the
governance system. To achieve water management
at the basin scale, unitary river-basin organizations
can be founded, or collaboration between existing
organizations at the river-basin level can be
instituted. Although the foundation of unitary riverbasin organizations (“strong” arrangements) is
often recommended, recent scholarship has started
emphasizing collaboration between existing

institutions as the preferred option. In complex
social–ecological systems such as river basins, with
interconnections between societal and ecological
processes at multiple levels, it is impossible to
determine the “right” boundaries for management
structures, and assigning all responsibilities related
to water management to a river-basin authority
would create a host of new coordination problems.
The governance literature suggests that collaborations
at the river-basin scale are increasingly common,
but that the pattern of institution building often
reflects the power asymmetries present in river
basins rather than ecological considerations. The
success of collaborations, and thus their
effectiveness, depends on a range of factors,
including the availability of slack resources and
stable sources of funding. The capacity to
collaborate seems to be better developed in
institutionally rich (polycentric) environments.
Democratic legitimacy in the river-basin approach
is an important issue for governance scholars, both
for large unitary river-basin authorities and for more
collaborative, polycentric approaches. Table 1
provides an overview of our conclusions.
In our analysis, we have treated the four institutional
prescriptions separately. However, depending on
how they are interpreted, they may overlap and
support each other, or there may be tension between
the different requirements. Public participation, for
instance, fits better in a polycentric philosophy than
in a monocentric philosophy, but the actual
implementation of public participation may be
easier in monocentric systems than in polycentric
systems. This is because it is easier to provide
feedback to the public if there is only one
(governmental) center of power than if there are
many. In a similar vein, management as
experimentation may be easier to organize in a
monocentric system than in a polycentric one.
Unitary river-basin authorities may have the effect
of increasing the distance between the public and
the centers of authority. Sub-basin or watershed
authorities at the local level may perform better in
that respect.
Coming back to the issue of feasibility, we want to
point to a less-noticed suggestion of Kai Lee (1999).
He proposed that advocates of adaptive (co-)
management consider dropping some of the
prescriptions as almost all of them are difficult to
realize in their own right, let alone in combination.
Prescriptions with relatively strong backing from
the governance literature tend to invite difficult
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Table 1. Summary of conclusions.

Polycentricity

Participation

Experimentation

Bioregional Approach

Theoretically sound?

Yes, but there are
concerns about
transaction costs and
accountability.

Yes.

Yes, but experiments
as a research
methodology yield
limited reflexivity.
Management as
experimentation is
only supported if the
experiments are small
in scale.

Yes. Preference is
shifting from unitary
river-basin organizations
as a means of
implementing a riverbasin management
approach to
collaborative,
polycentric
arrangements.

Feasible?

Fact of life, but the
Depends on the
value of diversity is
willingness and ability
not always understood. of authorities to
organize participation,
and of potential
participants to become
involved.

Experiments are often
difficult to implement
because of societal
resistance (equity
concerns). The
political landscape is
often transformed by
the time the
experiment is finished.

Unitary river-basin
organizations are very
rare; collaborations at the
river-basin scale are
increasingly popular.

Effective?

Not much can be said
because of the lack of
monitoring data and
the attribution
problem.

Not much known, but
in other policy
domains, experiments
are often watered
down to “pilots.”

Not much can be said
because of the lack of
monitoring data and the
attribution problem.

Can contribute to the
quality and legitimacy
of decisions, but the
connection to the
formal decision
process needs to be
clearly specified.

questions in practice as they deviate from the normal
state of affairs. In terms of feasibility, the question
becomes one of recognizing, creating, and
exploiting windows of opportunity. This requires
leadership (Olsson et al. 2006). Without necessarily
dropping any requirement permanently, it may be
advisable not to aim too high and wait for optimal
conditions, but instead act now and make use of the
opportunities that do exist at this moment, even if
the result currently falls short of the ideal. Yet, as
long as the ideal does not change, such opportunistic
behavior should not block further progress toward
the ideal.
The previous analysis suggests multiple venues for
further research. First of all, there is still a lack of
evidence for either the effectiveness or the
ineffectiveness of the different institutional
prescriptions. This calls for further empirical
research. These could be case studies, action

research, or quantitative analyses if sufficient
information on a relatively large number of cases
can be collected.
Secondly, the analysis suggests a number of
questions or issues that can be addressed in this
empirical research. These include:
●

How to facilitate collaboration in polycentric
governance settings, resolve or prevent
coordination problems, foster trust, and keep
transaction costs manageable, while ensuring
democratic legitimacy?

●

How to organize practical public participation
in polycentric settings, including participation
in any experiments that may be undertaken
or any other research, and how to organize a
follow-up to the participation?
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●

How to organize experiments in polycentric
settings and promote an “experimental
approach” to management that recognizes our
limited understanding of socioecological
systems and that maximizes learning from
experience?

anonymous reviewers of Ecology and Society. The
work reported on here is part of the NeWater project
(New Approaches to Adaptive Water Management
under Uncertainty) and was funded by the European
Commission (Contract No. 511179).

●

How to implement the bioregional approach
for water management and cope with the
multiplicity of relevant natural, social, and
administrative boundaries?

LITERATURE CITED

●
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